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MURPHY V. NCAA: THE SUPREME COURT’S
LATEST ADVANCE IN CHEMERINSKY’S
“FEDERALISM REVOLUTION”
Jonathan O. Ballard Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Federalism jurisprudence exists on a spectrum. As the ideological
preferences of the Supreme Court have shifted with the composition
of the bench, so too has the Court’s position on federalism shifted
between competing schools of thought. On one side of the spectrum is
the centralist tradition, advocating for a broad interpretation of the
federal government’s constitutional powers. On the other side is the
federalist tradition, preaching the virtues of state autonomy, ever-wary
of the federal government’s tyrannical potential.
The debate over federalism is undeniably political. Since the Civil
War, the tension between federal supremacy and state autonomy has
played a major role in the country’s most divisive political contests. 1
Many of these contests were decided in landmark Supreme Court
decisions that now define the role of federalism in our government.2
From 1937 to 1995, these decisions defined an era of Supreme
Court centralism.3 During this era, the Warren Court famously
augmented the federal government’s constitutional powers, allowing
progressives to effect social change in the form of fortified civil and
voting rights.4 Frustrated by the Court’s liberal tendencies,
conservatives began to campaign against this progression in the 1980s,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.M., Instrumental
Performance, Chapman University. I wish to thank the editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their insightful suggestions. Most importantly, I would like to thank my mother,
Elizabeth, my father, Jon, and my grandmother, Marilyn, without whom my academic
accomplishments would not have been possible. This article is dedicated to them.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7 (2001).
2. Robert K. Christensen & Charles R. Wise, Dead or Alive? The Federalism Revolution and
Its Meaning for Public Administration, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 920, 920 (2009).
3. Id.
4. Owen M. Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1117–21 (1991); Pamela S.
Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (2012).
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advocating for a significant reduction in the federal government’s
power.5
In the early 1990s, the Warren Court’s progressive reign came to
an end. Following the rise of Reagan-era neoconservatism in the
1980s, the Court, led by Republican appointees, began to revert back
to a federalist ideology in a movement Erwin Chemerinsky adeptly
titled the “Federalism Revolution.”6
During this time, the Court reinvigorated the Tenth Amendment
to substantially curtail the federal government’s power. The practice
continues to this day. In Murphy v. NCAA,7 the Court’s application of
the anticommandeering doctrine, in concert with its divergent
severability analysis, serves to further undermine the federal
government’s power and marks a major victory for federalists at large.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ANTICOMMANDEERING DOCTRINE
The Tenth Amendment limits Congress’s powers to those
enumerated in the Constitution. Missing from these powers is the
power to “issue direct orders to the governments of the States.”8 The
anticommandeering doctrine is a species of Tenth Amendment
common law that embodies this principle, preventing Congress from
compelling states or state officials to enforce federal law.
The doctrine was conceived in New York v. United States,9 in
which the Supreme Court held that Congress could not, by way of
federal statute, require the New York state government to provide for
disposal of radioactive waste created within its borders.10 The Court
held that this “take title” provision “would ‘commandeer’ state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and
would, for this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division
of authority between federal and state governments.”11

5. Inaugural Address, 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981) (“It is my intention to curb the
size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction
between the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or to the
people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the
States created the Federal Government.”).
6. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 7.
7. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
8. Id. at 1476.
9. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10. Id. at 175–76.
11. Id. at 175.
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Five years later, the Court elaborated on the doctrine in Printz v.
United States.12 In Printz, the Court “struck down the provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act . . . that required state
and local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks of
prospective handgun buyers.”13 In accordance with New York v.
United States, the Court held that Congress “may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions,
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”14 Under New
York v. United States and Printz, federal laws are considered
unconstitutional if: 1) the law “commandeers” state officials to
enforce federal law; and 2) the commandeered officials exercise
legislative or executive functions.
III. THE QUESTIONABLE COGENCY OF THE ANTICOMMANDEERING
DOCTRINE
Although it has become a mainstay of modern constitutional law,
the anticommandeering doctrine has been subject to extensive
criticism.15 Chief among critics’ objections to the doctrine is that it has
no constitutional basis. Indeed, as the late Justice Scalia admitted
when writing for the Printz majority, “there is no constitutional text
speaking to the precise question whether congressional action
compelling state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.”16
Having found the basis for the anticommandeering doctrine in
contentious characterizations of the framers’ legislative intent,17 the
12. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
13. Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering
Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1309–10 (2000) (footnote omitted).
14. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
15. See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion, and the Deep Structure of
American Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015) (contending that the Court’s “explanation of
and justification for” the anticommandeering doctrine as expressed in New York v. United States
and Printz “can neither explain nor justify the Court’s commandeering . . . decisions”); Steven
Schwinn, Symposium: It’s Time to Abandon Anti-commandeering (but Don’t Count on This
Supreme
Court
to
Do
It),
SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 17, 2017,
10:44
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-time-abandon-anti-commandeering-dont-countsupreme-court/ (“[T]his rule, which says that the federal government can’t require states or state
officials to adopt or enforce federal law, has no basis in the text or history of the document. It has
only weak support in precedent. And it’s unworkable.”).
16. Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.
17. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J.
1104, 1176 (2013) (“From the Founding generation’s perspective . . . the Constitution does not
categorically prevent the federal government from commandeering state executive and judicial
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doctrine’s creators have been accused of hypocrisy; having railed
against similar specific intent originalism in prior cases. 18 This
inexplicable hypocrisy, coupled with the doctrine’s lack of textual
support, appear more like the makings of a doctrinalized, ideological
bias rather than those of a legitimate species of constitutional
interpretation.
Dubious though it may be, the anticommendeering doctrine
persists. On May 14, 2018, the Court redeployed the doctrine in
Murphy v. NCAA.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Congress passed the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act (PASPA) in 1992, which made it illegal for states that did not
already permit sports gambling to pass laws legalizing it.19 Congress
considered the encroaching threat of widespread sports gambling a
“national problem” and enacted PASPA to prohibit states from
encouraging the practice.20 Congress worried that state-sanctioned
sports gambling would otherwise help the practice grow in popularity,
as it would stamp the practice with a “label of legitimacy.”21
Subsection 3702(1) of PASPA (“subsection (1)”) applied to statesponsored gambling, making it unlawful for “a governmental entity to
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize” sports
gambling “by law or compact.”22 Subsection 3702(2) (“subsection
(2)”) applied to private actors, making it unlawful for “a person to

officers. The Founders simply didn’t think that commandeering always violates federalism
principles. In fact, many thought just the opposite.”).
18. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that reliance on legislative intent “poison[s] the well of future legislation, depriving legislators of
the assurance that ordinary terms, used in an ordinary context, will be given a predictable
meaning”); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing that inquiries into legislative intent allows jurists to cherry-pick
evidentiary fragments that suit their own “predelictions [sic]”).
19. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1470 (2018); Lydia Wheeler, Court Rules Against
New
Jersey’s
Sports
Betting
Law,
HILL
(Aug. 25, 2015,
2:22
PM),
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/251913-court-rules-against-nj-in-sports-gamblingcase.
20. NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 216 (3d Cir. 2013) aff’g NCAA v.
Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013).
21. Id. at 237.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 3702(1) (2012), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.
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sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote” sports gambling “pursuant to
the law or compact of a governmental entity.”23
Despite PASPA’s enactment, the New Jersey legislature passed a
law in 2012 that enabled itself to legalize sports gambling.24 New
Jersey hoped legal sports gambling would rejuvenate Atlantic City’s
failing casinos.25
In NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 26 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals struck the 2012 law down, finding PASPA to be
preemptive.27 Undeterred by their defeat in court, New Jersey
promptly devised an alternative legal scheme.
In 2014, New Jersey “enacted legislation repealing the 2012 law
and other provisions of state law related to gaming” that barred sports
wagering in certain contexts.28 New Jersey believed that by
eliminating the aspects of the 2012 law that directly authorized sports
gambling and by repealing New Jersey’s existing anti-gambling laws,
it had effectively legalized certain forms of the practice. 29
That same year, the five major American sports leagues sought
an injunction against New Jersey, alleging that the new law violated
PASPA.30 In its defense, New Jersey argued that “PASPA
unconstitutionally infringed the State’s sovereign authority to end its
sports gambling ban.”31
A. Procedural History
Following the Third Circuit’s prior constitutional analysis of
PASPA in Christie and its own analysis of preemption doctrine, the
New Jersey District Court ruled that PASPA preempted the 2014
law.32 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.33

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

28 U.S.C. § 3702(2) (2012), invalidated by Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484–85.
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 491 (D.N.J. 2014).
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1469; Wheeler, supra note 19.
730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 235.
Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 491.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471.
Id.
Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 503–04.
NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir. 2015).
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New Jersey filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, invoking the
anticommandeering doctrine to call PASPA’s constitutionality
directly into question.34 The Supreme Court granted the petition.35
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
In an opinion penned by Justice Alito, the Court reversed the
Third Circuit’s decision and struck down PASPA for being
unconstitutional.36 The opinion began by interpreting the meaning of
PASPA’s operative text.37
New Jersey argued that the word “authorize” in subsection (1)
was equivalent to the word “permit,” and that “any state law that ha[d]
the effect of permitting sports gambling, including a law totally or
partially repealing a prior prohibition,” thus authorized the practice. 38
The NCAA interpreted the word more narrowly, arguing that “the
primary definition of ‘authorize’ requires affirmative action.”39 The
NCAA contended PASPA thus “empower[ed] a defined group of
entities . . . with the authority to conduct sports gambling
operations.”40
The Court adopted New Jersey’s definition, holding that “[w]hen
a State completely or partially repeals old laws banning sports
gambling, it ‘authorize[s]’ that activity.”41 Having interpreted
PASPA’s text, the Court then delved into its anticommandeering
doctrine analysis.42
The Court found that subsection (1) conflicted with the
anticommandeering doctrine because it “unequivocally dictate[d]
what a state legislature may and may not do.”43 Perhaps
melodramatically, the Court suggested, under subsection (1), “[i]t
[was] as if federal officers were installed in state legislative chambers
and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting on

34. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1473.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1478.
37. Id. at 1472–73.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Brief for Respondents at 39, Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (No.
16-476-77), 2017 WL 4684747 at *39).
40. Id. at 1473.
41. Id. at 1474 (alteration in original).
42. Id. at 1474–75.
43. Id. at 1478.
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any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty,”
the Court opined, was “not easy to imagine.”44
Next, the Court rejected the NCAA’s preemption argument.45
Preemption, the Court explained, “is based on a federal law that
regulates the conduct of private actors,” and in the case of subsection
(1), “there [was] simply no way to understand the provision
prohibiting state authorization as anything other than a direct
command to the States.”46 This type of prohibition, the Court
reiterated, “is exactly what the anticommandeering rule does not
allow.”47
V. THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE MURPHY
ANTICOMMANDEERING RULE
In many ways, Murphy’s impact on the future of sports betting is
less than profound. PASPA only prevented state legislatures from
repealing existing anti-gambling laws, so its invalidation had no
immediate effect on the legality of the practice in any state except New
Jersey. As of August 21, 2018, only six states have affirmatively
legalized sports betting and only fourteen others have considered
taking similar action.48 There is also little doubt that Congress could
directly preempt state sports gambling laws in the future if it chooses
to do so.49 Murphy is more significant in that it facilitates a potentially
greater divide between politically-divisive state and federal laws.
A. Marijuana
One of the most immediately identifiable consequences of
Murphy is that states now have greater latitude to legalize marijuana
under state law.50 Until Murphy, it was uncertain whether federal law,
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1481.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Phil Helsel, Sports Betting Is Now Legal in Several States. Many Others Are Watching
from the Sidelines., NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018, 2:13 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/sports-betting-now-legal-several-states-many-others-are-watching-n894211.
49. Michael C. Dorf, The Political Stakes of Commandeering in Murphy v. NCAA, DORF L.
(May 16, 2018,
12:01
AM),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/05/the-political-stakes-ofcommandeering.html.
50. Robert A. Mikos, The Implications of Murphy v. NCAA for State Marijuana Reforms,
VAND. U.L. SCH.: MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY (May 17, 2018),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2018/05/the-implications-of-murphy-v-ncaa-for-statemarijuana-reforms/.

(7) 52.2_BALLARD (DO NOT DELETE)

12/3/2019 1:33 AM

180

[Vol. 52:173

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

which unequivocally prohibits marijuana use, preempted any state
government’s legalization efforts.51 State courts, state governments,
and notable commentators on the matter disagreed about whether
legalization was an affirmative authorization that could be preempted
by Congress.52
State marijuana legalization efforts, however, often operate by
repealing existing anti-marijuana laws.53 By restoring “the state of
nature that existed until the early 1900s when marijuana bans were
first adopted,” states can adopt the same approach New Jersey used
when it repealed New Jersey’s anti-gambling laws.54 In Murphy, the
Court concluded that Congress could not prohibit state governments
from making such a choice, presumptively authorizing states to
legalize marijuana in this fashion.55
While there is no question that federal marijuana law can preempt
state legalization efforts in some respects, 56 Murphy dictates that
federal jurisdiction over marijuana use can extend only as far as the
federal resources allotted to enforce it. As more states legalize
marijuana, whether directly or by repealing existing laws, the federal
government’s preemptive anti-marijuana laws appear increasingly
impractical.
B. Immigration
Murphy’s prohibition on “authorizing” gambling may also have
profound consequences for the current legal skirmish being fought
over sanctuary cities. “Most ‘sanctuary’ policies are directions by state
and local governments to their own officials, ordering them not to do
certain things—turn over information about immigration and release
status, for example, or hold prisoners not charged with crimes solely
for the convenience of federal immigration authorities.”57 Recently,

51. See Brianne J. Gorod, Marijuana Legalization and Horizontal Federalism, 50 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 595, 601 (2016).
52. Id.
53. See Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1453 (2009).
54. Id.
55. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
56. Erwin Chemerinsky et. al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 74, 103 (2015).
57. Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court Says Congress Can’t Make States Dance to Its Tune,
ATLANTIC
(May 14, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/paspasanctuary-cities/560369/.
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the Trump administration has claimed that these policies violate 8
U.S.C. § 1373(a),58 which provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or
official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving
from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status,
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.59
By “prohibit[ing]” and “restrict[ing]” government entities from
not enforcing federal immigration policies however, section 1373(a)
makes the type of negative command to state governments deemed
unconstitutional in Murphy.60 A recent district court opinion, coming
only two months after Murphy, made this very observation.
In United States v. California,61 a federal district court in the
Eastern District of California considered the constitutionality of
section 1373(a) to be “highly suspect,” holding “that a Congressional
mandate prohibiting states from restricting their law enforcement
agencies’ involvement in immigration enforcement activities—apart
from, perhaps, a narrowly drawn information sharing provision—
would likely violate the Tenth Amendment.”62 The court found
Murphy supportive of its conclusion, citing Murphy for the proposition
that “a prohibition on state legislation violates the anticommandeering
rule.”63
While Murphy may have empowered left-leaning states to adopt
liberal marijuana and immigration policies to the chagrin of President
Trump’s administration, these progressive outcomes are likely to
prove anomalous. Because principles of federalism are usually
invoked to produce conservative outcomes, 64 Murphy will likely mark
a decisive victory for the right wing. The Court’s increasing

58. Experts Elucidate Trump Executive Order Targeting “Sanctuary Cities”, N.Y.U. L.
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/experts-trump-executive-order-immigrationtargeting-sanctuary-cities.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012).
60. Epps, supra note 57.
61. 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018).
62. Id. at 1101, 1109.
63. Id. at 1109 (citing Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018)).
64. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An Empirical
Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741 (2000).
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willingness to cut away at the federal government’s power and
potentially interfere with future, progressive legislation can also be
observed in the Murphy Court’s severability analysis.
VI. THE SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE
When part of a law is deemed unconstitutional, the severability
doctrine determines whether other, constitutionally valid parts of the
law remain in effect.65 Before Murphy, multifaceted laws were only
struck in their entirety when it was “evident that [Congress] would not
have enacted those provisions which [were] within its power,
independently of [those] which [were] not.”66 Severability was thus
presumed unless evidence of contrary legislative intent was
compelling enough to overcome this presumption.67
In discerning legislative intent, courts have considered a broad
spectrum of evidence, ranging from statutory phrasing and structure
to more nebulous interpretations of a statute’s purpose.68 The Supreme
Court has almost always made an effort to tether its severability
analyses to these types of evidence.69
By refusing to sever subsection (2) from subsection (1) without
meaningful evidence of Congress’s theoretical approval, the Court
departed from this precedent in Murphy.
A. Severability in Murphy
1. The Majority Opinion
The Murphy Court decided that the somewhat unintuitive results
of severing the two PASPA subsections would have deterred Congress
from passing subsection (2) in isolation.70 First, the Court reasoned
that Congress would not have wanted to legalize sports gambling in
private casinos while simultaneously prohibiting state-run sports
65. Brian C. Lea, Situational Severability, 103 VA. L. REV. 735, 737 (2017).
66. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1482 (2018) (alterations in original) (quoting Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
67. See id. at 1489–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Lea, supra note 65, at 746–47.
69. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telcomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 810
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The congressional findings in the
statute and the conclusions of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
after more than two years of hearings on the cable market are instructive.”); Alaska Airlines, Inc.,
480 U.S. at 691–96 (analyzing Senate reports).
70. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482–83 (majority opinion).
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lotteries.71 Because private gambling is considered more pernicious to
society than state-operated lotteries, legalizing sports gambling in
casinos while prohibiting state-sponsored sports lotteries seemed to
the Court, “exactly backwards.”72
Second, the Court addressed the supposedly incoherent results of
enforcing subsection (2) on its own. Under subsection (2), private
sports gambling would have been illegal if state law made it legal.73
Conversely, if state law did make private sports gambling illegal,
subsection (2) would not have applied.74
The Court characterized this functional quirk as “perverse,” as it
undermined “whatever policy is favored by the people of a State.”75
The Court intuited that Congress would not have endorsed this “weird
result.”76
2. The Breyer Concurrence
While Justice Breyer agreed that subsection (1) was
unconstitutional, in his concurrence, he took issue with the majority’s
characterization of Congress’s legislative intent. Contrary to the
majority’s presumptions, Justice Breyer contended that the “weird”
manner in which subsection (2) operated could have been
intentional.77 Justice Breyer argued that Congress may have wanted
subsection (2) to apply only when state law would not otherwise have
made sports gambling illegal because Congress “may have preferred
that state authorities enforce state law forbidding sports gambling than
require federal authorities to bring civil suits to enforce federal law
forbidding about the same thing.78 Alternatively, Justice Breyer
contended that Congress may have included subsection (2) as a
constitutional “backup” if subsection (1) was deemed
unconstitutional, specifically contemplating the issue at bar.79

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1483.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1484.
Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
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3. The Ginsburg Dissent
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg focused almost all of her attention
on her vehement disagreement with the Court’s decision not to sever
subsection (2),80 accusing the Court of “wield[ing] an ax to cut
down” the subsection “instead of using a scalpel.”81 Justice Ginsburg
argued that even if subsection (1) was unconstitutional (a point she
refused to concede), the severability doctrine should have preserved
its constitutionally sound counterpart.82
Ginsburg found the majority’s characterization of the legislative
intent meritless.83 “On no rational ground,” Ginsburg contended,
“[could] it be concluded that Congress would have preferred no statute
at all if it could not prohibit States from authorizing or licensing such
schemes.”84
B. Murphy Departs from Severability Precedent
When the Court characterized Congress’s hypothetical
preferences in its severability analyses, it failed to cite any meaningful
evidence indicating Congress would have thought alike. Tellingly, the
Court cited a Senate report only once, referencing a Congressional
Budget Office estimate that calculated the price of enforcing PASPA
as a whole.85 The Court suggested that this report indicated that
Congress would never have wanted PASPA enforced piecemeal. 86
This suggestion is illogical.
While the estimate undeniably calculated the cost of PASPA as a
whole, it did not shed light on Congress’s hypothetical intent had
Congress known PASPA was enforceable only in part. The estimate’s
contemplation of one particular scenario, total enforcement, cannot be
logically interpreted as evidence that Congress wished to foreclose all
other possible enforcement scenarios. Despite the Court’s token use of
documentary evidence, the conclusion that Congress would have
disfavored preserving subsection (2) remained completely
unsubstantiated. 87
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1488–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1490.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1484 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1490.
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In fact, the available evidence supports the opposite conclusion.
The Senate reports reflect Congress’s unqualified desire to discourage
sports gambling, irrespective of whether its means of doing so were
ultimately weakened or made “weird” by judicial review.88 Despite
the intuitive meaning of the evidence and the compelling
counterarguments levied by the dissenting Justices, the Court elected
to fabricate its own rationale for declining severability, couching its
most significant analysis in counterfactual supposition. By doing so,
the Court ignored the presumption of severability and judicial restraint
that had previously defined severability precedent.
C. The Political Ramifications of Murphy Severability Analysis
The Murphy Court’s increased willingness to decline severability
has significant political consequences. Some of the most historic
liberal legislation passed in the last century has survived judicial
review only because the Court was willing to apply the severability
doctrine.89 For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act survived judicial review in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius90 only because five out of nine Justices were
willing to preserve what remained of the act after the majority struck
its Medicaid expansion provision for being unconstitutional.91 After
Murphy, liberal legislators will be wary of the Court’s more
threatening severability standard when drafting similarly
comprehensive legislation.
VII. CONCLUSION
By augmenting the anticommandeering doctrine and by relaxing
the evidentiary standard for declining severability, Murphy made clear
that challenged federal statutes that conflict with federalist tenets, even
if only in part, will likely be stricken in their entirety. Should the
Court’s decidedly conservative majority outlast the Republicans’
control of Congress, the anticommandeering doctrine, in combination
with this new severability standard, could very well frustrate future
88. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4–7 (1991) (“The purpose of S. 474 is to prohibit sports
gambling conducted by, or authorized under the law of, any State or other governmental entity.”).
89. See Lea, supra note 65, at 737–38 (2017) (“[S]everability doctrine has determined the fates
of many landmark laws, including the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Federal Election
Campaign Act . . . and the Social Security Act.”).
90. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
91. Id. at 586–87; Lea, supra note 65, at 737.
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liberal legislation. Given that Justice Kavanaugh, a staunch
conservative92 and federalist93 in his own right, has recently been
appointed to the Supreme Court, this era of Supreme Court federalism
is likely to last into the foreseeable future.

92. See Alvin Chang, Brett Kavanaugh and the Supreme Court’s Drastic Shift to the Right,
Cartoonsplained, VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/9/17537808/supremecourt-brett-kavanaugh-right-cartoon (last updated Sept. 14, 2018).
93. Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Brett Kavanaugh’s Record Shows Push to Restrain the
Regulatory State, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 31, 2018, 1:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brettkavanaughs-record-shows-push-to-restrain-the-regulatory-state-1535737394.

